University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2006

Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of
Contemporary Law and Understandings
Mark A. Godsey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Godsey, Mark A., "Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings" (2006). Minnesota Law
Review. 16.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

GODSEY_3FMT

04/20/2006 10:25:48 AM

Article

Reformulating the Miranda Warnings
in Light of Contemporary Law and
Understandings
Mark A. Godsey†
Since Miranda v. Arizona1 was decided in 1966, scholars
have devoted much attention to both the theoretical underpinnings and the real world impact of that decision. Commentators
have debated, among other things, whether the warnings unduly hamper the ability of the police to obtain confessions,2
whether the Court correctly construed the Fifth Amendment’s
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Dressler, Ric Simmons, Alan Michaels, and Marc Spindelman of Ohio State;
Christopher Slobogin of Florida; and John Valauri and Michael Mannheimer
of Northern Kentucky University for reviewing drafts of this Article and providing helpful feedback. I would also like to thank the faculties at the University of Cincinnati, Ohio State, Florida, and Northern Kentucky for the helpful
comments they provided to me when I presented this piece at their respective
schools. Finally, I would like to thank UC law student Michelle Berry for her
outstanding research assistance, and the Harold C. Schott Foundation for providing a grant to further this scholarly endeavor. Copyright © 2006 by Mark
A. Godsey.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda’s Social
Costs] (arguing that the Miranda warnings impose high social costs in the
form of many lost confessions); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from
False Confessions and Lost Confessions—And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998) (arguing that the Miranda warnings prevent police
from obtaining confessions, which harms the innocent by permitting criminals
to remain on the streets); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) (arguing that Miranda’s costs in terms
of lost confessions are small); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 500 (1996) (same).
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Self-Incrimination Clause3 in crafting the warnings,4 whether
the warnings requirement itself constitutes a legitimate exercise of the Court’s authority,5 and whether the warnings are
constitutional in nature.6
Little attention, however, has been paid to the substance or
content of the warnings. As anyone who watches television
crime dramas knows, a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation must first be advised that she has a right to remain silent, that anything she says may be used against her in court,
that she has a right to an attorney during questioning, and that
if she cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for her.7
The Supreme Court has often stated that the Miranda warnings requirement is a prophylactic rule that can change and
evolve.8 However, in spite of forty years of legal developments

3. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 435 (1987) (arguing that the Miranda Court correctly construed the SelfIncrimination Clause); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties:
A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 174–81 (1988) (arguing to the contrary).
5. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 453–55 (arguing that the Court
properly exercised its authority in crafting the Miranda warnings); Grano, supra note 4 (arguing to the contrary).
6. See, e.g., Debate, Paul Cassell v. Robert Litt, Will Miranda Survive?:
Dickerson v. United States: The Right to Remain Silent, the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165 (2000) (Professor Paul Cassell debating Mr. Robert Litt over the issue at the Georgetown University Law Center
on Mar. 28, 2000); see also Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The
International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a
Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1735–52
(discussing the status of Miranda warnings as a constitutional prophylactic
rule and providing numerous citations to law review articles debating this issue).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–73 (1966) (describing the warnings required prior to “in-custody interrogation”).
8. In Dickerson v. United States, for example, the Court cited several
cases establishing that Miranda is a flexible, prophylactic rule and stated:
These decisions illustrate the principle—not that Miranda is not a
constitutional rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No
court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of
modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part
of constitutional law as the original decision.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (citing New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
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and practical experience, the content of these famous four
warnings has never been modified or even been subjected to
systematic scrutiny.
This Article proposes that the substance of the Miranda
warnings should be reconsidered as the rules of law underlying
the warnings substantially evolve, and as we gain new insights
into their effectiveness (or lack thereof ). In light of the significant legal changes of the last four decades, and the real world
experience gained with the warnings during this time,
Miranda’s fortieth anniversary presents an opportune time to
reexamine the content of the warnings. This examination
should ensure that the warnings remain consistent with and
continue to reflect the evolving legal principles that support
and justify their existence, and to reaffirm that they remain effective in upholding and enforcing the constitutional rights of
suspects.
A close examination of the warnings suggests that they are
out of date. If the warnings were redesigned today by a Court
as mindful of properly balancing the competing interests as
was the Miranda Court, they would probably take a different
form.9 In contemplating this new form, my purpose in this Article is not to delve into every conceivable modification to the
warnings that one might consider. Rather, my goal is to introduce the concept of updating the warnings using a few examples, with the hope that I will generate discussion on this important issue. I attempt to do this by suggesting and discussing
a few potential changes to the warnings that appear to me to be
among the most pressing.10
First, I propose that the first two warnings, relating to the
right to silence, should be buttressed by a new “right to silence”
warning that provides something to the effect of: “If you choose
to remain silent, your silence will not be used against you as
9. In some ways, the task this Article undertakes might be seen as an
academic exercise. Indeed, I am asking in part what the Miranda Court would
have done had it known what we know today. As one commentator stated
when I presented this paper at a workshop, “The Miranda Court disliked confessions . . . . The current Court likes them.” This is another way of saying that
the current Court would likely have no interest in improving the warnings or
bringing them up-to-date. Nevertheless, the Court’s views may change in time,
and the suggestions in this Article could be adopted by state legislatures.
10. While the Supreme Court could, of course, modify the Miranda warnings, the most likely venue for policy changes of the magnitude suggested in
this Article might be state legislatures. The Court would then be faced with
the question of whether the legislated changes are constitutional.
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evidence to suggest that you committed a crime simply because
you refused to speak.”
Next, the third and fourth warnings, relating to the right
to counsel, should be removed and replaced with three new requirements, reflecting legal developments and practical lessons
that have come to light since 1966. The first requirement would
be a new warning as follows: “If you choose to talk, you may
change your mind and remain silent at any time, even if you
have already spoken.” The second requirement would be a rule
mandating that the police reinstruct suspects of the new
Miranda warnings at intervals throughout lengthy interrogations. Finally, the police would be required to videotape interrogations. These three new requirements would more effectively achieve the intended policy goals of the right to counsel
warnings and, thus, should be considered as replacements to
the right to counsel warnings in the prophylactic scheme.
This Article first examines, in Part I, a few specific postMiranda changes and developments in law, understandings,
and practical knowledge. Part II then asks whether modifications to the warnings to reflect such new developments make
sense in light of the various justifications and theories of
Miranda put forth by scholars and courts.
Specifically, Part I begins the journey into the suggested
modifications by exploring the changes that have occurred in
Miranda’s surroundings since 1966. Part I.A explains how the
theoretical underpinnings of the Miranda warnings have
evolved since that time. Miranda has morphed from an inflexible constitutional command to a flexible prophylactic rule that
can be modified in the manner suggested in this Article. With
this fact in mind, Part I.B focuses on post-Miranda developments regarding the right of a suspect to bar the prosecution
from using her decision to remain silent against her as evidence of guilt at trial. This substantive right did not clearly exist at the time that Miranda was decided. Although it was formally recognized as a substantive right in 1976, it was not at
that time added to the litany of rights police are required to recite under Miranda. In addition, this Part develops the hypothesis that one of the leading reasons why Miranda has not
had its anticipated effect—why most suspects feel compulsion
and waive their Miranda rights—is because suspects are not
informed of this right. In other words, suspects may waive their
rights simply because they erroneously conclude that remain-
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ing silent “looks bad” and will ultimately hurt their chances in
court, basing their decision on a set of warnings that has not
yet caught up with the law. This pressure, or fear of a severe
penalty, may constitute compulsion in violation of the SelfIncrimination Clause.
Part I.C examines post-Miranda developments regarding
the right to counsel during interrogations. The right to counsel
warnings were designed for several reasons, the primary of
which was to ensure that suspects have a “continuous opportunity to exercise”11 their right to remain silent. This Part focuses
on the demonstrably ineffective nature of the right to counsel
warnings in practical application, and posits that these warnings have not had their intended effect. This Part also explores
the erosion of the substantive, legal right to counsel during interrogations that has occurred since Miranda was decided.
Part II then addresses the impact these specific modern
developments should have on the warnings themselves in light
of various modern justifications of Miranda set forth by courts
and scholars. It asks whether these suggested modifications to
the warnings can be supported and would be made under several of these distinct, competing justifications for the warnings.
Part II.A analyzes whether changes to the warnings should be
made, in light of the modern developments set forth in Part I,
under the Miranda decision’s original “compulsion” theory.
Part II.B analyzes the appropriateness of the proposed modifications under the due process “voluntariness” theory of
Miranda jurisprudence, which currently has many adherents.
Part II.C analyzes whether changes to the warnings should be
made under the due process notice theory proffered by leading
Miranda scholar George C. Thomas III. Finally, Part II.D analyzes the proposed modifications under the “objective penalties”
theory of Miranda.
I. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS: 1966–2006
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WARNINGS
At the outset, it is important to briefly explore how the
Court’s doctrinal justification for the warnings has evolved over
time. This effort is necessary to support the notion that changing or modifying the warnings, which this Article will discuss

11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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in its remainder, is an exercise that does not run afoul of the
Court’s teachings.
1. The Miranda Court: 1966
It is likely that in 1966, the Miranda Court would have
looked askance at the suggestion of modifying the warnings
decades later. The Court stated that the warnings were not intended to be a “constitutional straightjacket.”12 Congress and
the states were free to experiment with alternative methods of
“apprising accused persons of their right of silence” and assuring that such individuals have “a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”13 The Court suggested, however, that any “potential
alternatives for protecting the privilege”14 had to be at least as
effective in conveying the substantive content of the four warnings as the procedure set forth by the Court.15 In other words,
while the Court appeared open to modifying the mechanism by
which suspects could be informed of their rights, a fair reading
of Miranda suggests that the Court was not open to changing
the content of the information that must be conveyed.16
Because it is difficult to imagine a politically palatable
method by which suspects could be advised of their rights other
than the suggested procedure of having police officers recite the
warnings,17 it is arguable that the Court was merely paying
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (stating that alternative procedures had to be “at least as effective
in apprising accused persons” of their rights as the method set forth in the
Miranda decision).
16. In Duckworth v. Eagan, the Court approved a set of warnings where
the officer in question had slightly altered them from the standard Miranda
warnings, holding that the warnings need not be given in the “exact form” provided by the Miranda decision. 492 U.S. 195, 202–05 (1989). The Duckworth
Court reminded, however, that whatever form of warnings an officer devises
must “touch[ ] all of the bases” of Miranda to pass constitutional muster. See
id. at 203. Thus, in 1989, the Court appeared to disfavor the idea of dramatically changing the content of the warnings in the manner suggested in this
Article, although the question of overhauling the warnings in light of modern
developments was not directly before the Court at that time.
17. Perhaps the Miranda Court had in mind a rule that counsel must be
provided to each suspect prior to interrogation. This would allow the substance
of the warnings to be conveyed by the suspect’s own attorney, and would satisfy the concerns surrounding the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation expressed by the Miranda Court. As the Court was unwilling to go this
far itself in the Miranda decision, it likely viewed this as an alternative that
Congress and the states were unlikely to adopt. Time has proven this hy-
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diplomatic lip service to the idea that Congress and the states
were free to experiment with alternative procedures. In reality,
the four warnings did act as a straightjacket,18 and the Court’s
unequivocal and strong language throughout the rest of its
opinion hammered home the point that the basic content of all
four warnings must be conveyed to suspects prior to custodial
interrogation.19
The notion that the Miranda Court would not have been
amenable to the idea of future modifications in the substance of
the warnings is fortified not only by the Court’s strong language, but by the theory that it employed to justify the warnings themselves. Indeed, the Court required the warnings as a
direct result of its interpretation of the word “compelled” in the
text of the Self-Incrimination Clause.20 The Court held that the
atmospheric pressure or coercion inherent in custodial interrogation equates with compulsion and, thus, runs afoul of the

pothesis to be correct, as no jurisdiction has adopted this alternative method of
apprising suspects of their rights. The Court might also have envisioned a system whereby suspects were to be brought before a neutral magistrate prior to
custodial interrogation, with the magistrate then apprising them of their
rights. As this procedure is even more suspect-friendly than the rule devised
in Miranda, it too was likely not seen as a politically feasible alternative, and
it has not been subsequently adopted except in limited situations in the context of advising juveniles of their Miranda rights. See Jennifer J. Walters,
Comment, Illinois’ Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487, 504 n.149 (2002) (discussing magistrate warning rule
for juveniles in Texas).
18. Notably, jurisdictions in the United States did not widely experiment
with alternative methods of advising suspects of their rights after the
Miranda decision. This is likely because the police-based procedure the
Miranda Court set forth was the most politically palatable method imaginable. In 1968, Congress attempted to create a new procedure by enacting 18
U.S.C. § 3501, which made the recitation of warnings merely one factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. See Godsey, supra note 6, at
1742–43. Because this statute was generally seen as unconstitutional, as it
deviated from Miranda’s dictates, it was largely ignored by federal prosecutors
until it was held unconstitutional by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
441 (2000). See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1742–52.
19. For example, the Miranda Court stated that the substance of the
warnings “must” be provided and is an “absolute prerequisite to interrogation,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–72, and a prerequisite to the admissibility of
any resulting confession, id. at 476.
20. See id. at 461–62; see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled SelfIncrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 499–505 (2005) (discussing the Miranda
Court’s recognition of the Self-Incrimination Clause’s ban on compelled statements as the proper test for confession admissibility).
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Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.21 Rather than
ban custodial interrogation outright, however, the Court held
that interrogations could ensue in such circumstances if the
pressure was first dispelled by the recitation or waiver of warnings.22
In delineating the four required warnings, the Court
viewed each as having its own unique and important role in
dispelling the pressure. The Court required the first warning,
“You have a right to remain silent,” for several related reasons:
to inform the suspect of this “fundamental” right, to assure the
suspect that she will not be penalized for refusing to talk, and
to let even the most educated suspect know that the police are
playing by the rules and that she has the power to stop the interrogation if she chooses.23 The Court required the second
warning, “Anything you say may be used against you in a court
of law,” to make the suspect aware of the consequences of
speaking, and to ensure that the suspect understands that she
has entered an adversarial phase of the criminal justice system
and that the police may not have her best interests in mind.24
The Court deemed the third warning, “You have a right to
an attorney during the interrogation,” necessary for three reasons. First and foremost, it was seen as a fortification of the
first warning.25 Because the Court viewed custodial interrogation as a practice that can quickly “overbear the will of one
merely made aware of”26 her right to silence, a suspect with
counsel present in the interrogation room would have an ally to
constantly remind her of her rights and look out for her interests.27 The presence of counsel would ensure that compulsion
did not seep back into the interrogation room. Other benefits of
the right to counsel warning include the fact that the police
would be unlikely to engage in third-degree interrogation tactics with counsel present, that counsel could be a witness to
such police conduct if it occurred, and that counsel could ensure
that the accused gives an accurate statement that is correctly
recorded by the police.28 The final warning, “If you cannot af21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461, 469.
Id. at 467–77; see also Godsey, supra note 20, at 499–505.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69.
Id. at 469.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 469–70.
Id. at 470.
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ford an attorney one will be appointed for you,” was designed to
make clear that the right to counsel is available to all, so that
an indigent suspect does not feel compulsion because she
wrongly assumes that this right applies only to those who have
sufficient means to procure a lawyer.29
Thus, the Court viewed each warning as directly tied to,
and stemming from, the Self-Incrimination Clause. Each warning played a role by itself and in combination with the others in
dispelling the inherent pressure and removing the “compulsion”
from the interrogation setting, and in ensuring that the interrogation room remains compulsion-free for the duration of the
interview. Accordingly, removing one of the warnings would be
tantamount to removing a brick from a dam, as it would cause
the protective barrier to crumble and render the warnings ineffective.
2. Post-Miranda: 1966–2006
Shortly after Miranda was decided, however, the Court retreated from its “compulsion” theory as originally delineated in
Miranda. In a line of cases that includes Harris v. New York,30
New York v. Quarles,31 Michigan v. Tucker,32 Dickerson v.
United States,33 and United States v. Patane,34 among others,
the Court made two important changes to confession jurisprudence. First, the Court retracted its compulsion analysis of the
Miranda decision, and reasserted the pre-Miranda voluntariness test as the primary standard for determining the admissibility of confessions.35 Second, the Court recast the Miranda
warnings requirement as a flexible, prophylactic rule, which is
designed as a first-step litmus test to determine whether or not
a confession was made voluntarily.36
29. Id. at 473.
30. 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (holding that a statement taken from a
defendant during custodial interrogation where no Miranda warnings had
been administered may be used for impeachment purposes at trial).
31. 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (creating a “public safety” exception to
the Miranda warnings requirement).
32. 417 U.S. 433, 445–46, 450–52 (1974) (ruling that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply with full force to Miranda violations).
33. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Miranda is a constitutional
prophylactic rule that cannot be overruled by an act of Congress).
34. 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine does not apply to Miranda warnings).
35. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 505–08, 515.
36. Id. at 508. The complicated process by which the Court achieved these
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Today, the Miranda warnings are most accurately considered a judge-made, prophylactic rule, the application of which
can be subjected to a balancing test.37 While the warnings have
a “constitutional basis,”38 no longer is each warning tied to the
Self-Incrimination Clause with a unique and clearly defined
role to play in dissipating the “inherent compulsions of the interrogation process” described in Miranda.39 Rather, in a lessdefined manner, the recitation-and-waiver process now simply
creates a presumption of voluntariness and admissibility.40
While the Court has never directly held that the content of
the warnings are subject to modification, the detachment of the
warnings from the concept of Miranda-compulsion, and the recasting of the warnings requirement as a flexible, prophylactic
rule, create leeway for modification. The authority supporting
modification will be explored in more detail in Part II. Before
turning to that discussion, however, it is imperative to first explore the post-Miranda changes in law and practical knowledge
that create a foundation for the proposed modifications. These
changes are discussed in turn in Parts B and C below.
B. USING A SUSPECT’S POST-MIRANDA WARNING SILENCE
AGAINST HER
1. Legal Developments
At the time that Miranda was decided, the law was not
clear as to whether a suspect’s silence after receiving the warnings could be used against her at trial as evidence of guilt.
However, one could infer from the Court’s teachings that such
use of silence was probably impermissible. In Miranda, for example, the Court implied that the first warning, “You have a
right to remain silent,” was required in part because a rational
suspect might otherwise conclude that “silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a
jury.”41 From this somewhat vague statement, one can glean

results is beyond the scope of this Article. For a full discussion of this transformation, see id. at 505–15.
37. See id. at 507.
38. Id. at 512; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–74 (1966).
40. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 513; see also infra notes 111–15 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of voluntariness).
41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
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that perhaps the Court viewed the first warning as carrying
with it an implicit promise that silence will not later be used
against the suspect at trial.42 The Miranda Court apparently
believed that this implicit promise worked in hand with the explicit warnings to dissipate the coercion inherent in custodial
interrogation.
Also, in Griffin v. California,43 decided the term prior to
Miranda, the Court held that when a defendant invokes his
Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial, the prosecutor
and judge cannot suggest to the jury that it consider such silence as indicative of guilt.44 Griffin is not directly on point,
however, because the Court has interpreted the SelfIncrimination Clause in the formal context such as trials in a
very different manner than it has interpreted the same clause
in the pretrial interrogation context.45 Nonetheless, Griffin
provided some support by analogy to the argument that a suspect’s interrogation silence could likewise not be used against
her at trial.46
It was not until Doyle v. Ohio47 in 1976, however, that the
Court expressly held that a suspect’s decision to remain silent
during an interrogation, after the recitation of Miranda warnings, could not be used against her by the prosecution at trial to
infer guilt.48 Although the precise holding in Doyle was that the
prosecution cannot use such silence to impeach the defendant,49
nearly all courts have agreed that this holding carries with it
the obvious implication that post-warning silence likewise cannot be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief.50 The Court
in Doyle “stressed that the warnings carry at least an implicit
assurance that silence will not be used against the arrestee—

42. The Miranda Court provided a glimpse of what was to come in dicta
buried in an obscure footnote, stating, “[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police
custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not . . . use at trial the fact that
he stood mute or claimed his privilege . . . .” See id. at 468 n.37.
43. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
44. Id. at 615.
45. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 492–95, 502–05, 515–17.
46. See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 111 & n.42, 134
(2001).
47. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
48. Id. at 617–18.
49. Id.
50. See Strauss, supra note 46, at 112 n.43 (citing cases).
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that the exercise of the right to remain silent carries no penalty.”51
The implicit nature of the assurance is apparently derived
from the fact that the warnings describe the suspect’s decision
to remain silent as a “right.” While this inference is perhaps
less than obvious, the expectation of the Miranda Court was
that suspects will understand that if their silence were to be
used against them later, then their decision to remain silent is
not really much of a right at all. In other words, because silence
is couched as a “right,” suspects will conclude that their silence
will not be used against them. The prosecution’s act of breaking
this implied promise by introducing the suspect’s silence into
evidence at trial, therefore, is “fundamentally unfair” and constitutes a deprivation of due process.52
2. Practical Experience
Forty years of experience has shown that the substantive
right the Doyle Court believed was implicit in the Miranda
warnings—that silence will not be later used against the suspect—is not recognized or understood by most suspects undergoing custodial interrogation. In what likely would have been a
major surprise to the Miranda court,53 modern studies demonstrate that roughly eighty percent of suspects waive their
Miranda rights and talk to the police.54 These individuals have
51. Id. at 110.
52. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. The Doyle decision was grounded in due process rather than the Self-Incrimination Clause. Id. at 619. Because the use of
post-Miranda warning silence to infer guilt at trial constitutes an impermissible penalty, the Doyle Court could have grounded its decision in the SelfIncrimination Clause. See generally Godsey, supra note 20, at 515–17 (proposing an objective penalty test for compulsion in interrogation).
53. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417,
1448 (1985) (noting that the Miranda Court anticipated that waiver would occur rarely and only in extraordinary cases); George C. Thomas III, Stories
About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1977 (2004) (suggesting that the
Miranda Court would have been “stunned” by waiver rates).
54. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839,
842, 860 tbl.3 (1996) (waiver rate of eighty-four percent); id. at 843–49 (discussing various studies on the effects of Miranda); Richard A. Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 tbl.3 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room] (waiver rate of seventy-eight percent); Thomas, supra note 53, at 1972 tbl.2 (waiver rate of sixty-eight percent).
See generally Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 2 (discussing results
of various empirical studies of Miranda’s impact, with focus on “lost confessions” rate); Leo, supra note 2, at 632–52 (same); Schulhofer, supra note 2
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been informed that they may remain silent and have the guidance of an attorney, yet they choose to go it alone and talk.
While many reasons certainly contribute to the willingness of
Mirandized suspects to talk to the police,55 a major factor undoubtedly is that many suspects naturally believe, albeit incorrectly, that remaining silent will make them “look guilty” and
will be used against them as evidence of guilt.
Indeed, common sense and everyday intuition suggest that
the fear of silence being used as a penalty plays an important
role in this phenomenon. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham once
expressed, “[S]ilence . . . by common sense, at the report of universal experience, [is] certified to be tantamount to confession.”56 The fact that suspects naturally assume that their silence will be used against them is captured in Kent
Greenawalt’s classic essay, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right.57 Greenawalt sets forth a hypothetical in which
Ann has evidence to conclude that her friend Betty has stolen
her bracelet.58 If Ann confronts Betty with the charge, and
Betty remains silent, Ann should, based on common sense and
everyday conceptions of morality, “rightly perceive Betty’s silence . . . as substantially probative of guilt; . . . no possible bar
will exist to her according silence the weight it naturally has in
this context. . . . Ann would be justified in acting as if Betty had
committed the original wrong.”59
Silence in the face of accusation so intuitively carries the
label of guilt that the criminal courts of England allow jurors to
infer guilt in cases where the defendant was questioned by the
police and refused to talk.60 The fact that the law in the United
(same).
55. See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 8–64 (2000) (discussing
some of the deep-seated psychological and cultural reasons why suspects
choose to speak to the police and confess); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions
Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1826, 1828–29 (1987) (discussing a suspect’s “almost irresistible impulse
to respond to . . . accusations”); Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding
the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 254–
55 (2004) (listing reasons why suspects feel compelled to confess).
56. 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 39 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1838).
57. R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23
WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981).
58. See id. at 22.
59. Id. at 25.
60. See Gregory W. O’Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and
Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
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States recently prohibited such use of silence is counterintuitive to this natural human instinct, and would therefore probably not be obvious or apparent to most American suspects without having it expressly stated to them. Because the outdated
Miranda warnings do not disabuse suspects of this erroneous
assumption, suspects waive their rights and talk “just to avoid
the guilty implication of silence.”61
Research findings back up this claim. Richard J. Ofshe and
Richard A. Leo, two of the leading empirical researchers of
Miranda and its impact, have written that suspects tend to
waive their Miranda rights and speak to the police at a high
rate in part because they “view invoking Miranda as either
wrong and/or tantamount to an admission of guilt.”62 Even the
educated are sometimes unable to grasp the “implicit promise”
of Miranda. Indeed, Ofshe and Leo cite an example of a middleclass university student who provided the following reason why
he waived his rights: “Somehow it seems—it feels to me that if
I ask for a lawyer that I’m admitting guilt and I know I’m not,
but it’s, you know, it’s just a preposterous idea to me that it’s
even considered.”63
The findings of Ofshe and Leo are buttressed by an examination of materials and pamphlets produced by criminal defense attorneys for their potential clients. One example is a
pamphlet prepared by attorney Katya Komisaruk for the Just
Cause Law Collective entitled, What To Do if You’re Approached for Questioning by the FBI or Other Law Enforcement
Agencies.64 The pamphlet goes to great length to disabuse potential suspects of the natural but mistaken belief that silence
will be used against them:
Exercising your right to remain silent doesn’t make you seem guilty
. . . . To make sure that no one is punished for remaining silent, the
authorities are forbidden to use your refusal to answer questions as

402, 428–29, 445 (1994).
61. See Salas, supra note 55, at 255.
62. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1002 (1997);
see also MALIN ÅKERSTRÖM, BETRAYAL AND BETRAYERS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF
TREACHERY 71 (1991) (“The inmates I interviewed all believed that silence
during an interrogation was interpreted as guilt.”).
63. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 62, at 1002.
64. KATYA KOMISARUK, JUST CAUSE LAW COLLECTIVE, WHAT TO DO IF
YOU’RE APPROACHED FOR QUESTIONING BY THE FBI OR OTHER LAW ENAGENCIES
(2003),
available
at
http://www.adcsf.org/
FORCEMENT
HandlingFBIDraft03-24-03.pdf.
OGY
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an excuse for searching or arresting you. And in court, judges will declare a mistrial if the prosecutor even implies that your being silent
means you’re guilty.65

This pamphlet and others of similar ilk66 suggest that
criminal defense attorneys, with years of experience representing clients who have confessed after receiving Miranda warnings, know that their clients often waive their rights and talk
simply because they are not informed of all of their relevant
rights.67 In particular, suspects do not understand that they
have nothing to lose by remaining silent. Criminal defense attorneys find it necessary to supplement the warnings with this
important new right that the Miranda warnings continue to
omit.68
In sum, suspects who remain silent in the face of Miranda
warnings cannot be penalized for doing so in light of law that
developed a decade after Miranda was decided. Yet suspects
remain uninformed of this fact. Common sense and research

65. Id. at 3; see also Scott Turow, Miranda’s Value in the Trenches, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A27 (“Confronted with an accusation, most people
can’t resist the impulse to explain, probably fearing that remaining silent
would make them look guilty.”).
66. See, e.g., CMTY. LEGAL EDUC. ONTARIO, TALKING TO POLICE 4 (2002),
available at http://www.cleo.on.ca/english/pub/onpub/pdf/youth/talking.pdf
(“Your right to remain silent won’t be used against you. You might worry
about what will happen if you refuse to talk to the police. You might think it
will make you look guilty, or that it will be held against you. It won’t.”); Kelly
W. Parker, The Right to Remain Silent: What You Should Know (2000),
http://library.findlaw.com/2000/Feb/1/132011.html (“It is always instructive to
remember there is no penalty that can be imposed for exercising your right to
remain silent. The fact that you exercised this right cannot be used against
you at trial.”).
67. See Ogletree, supra note 55, at 1828 (describing his experience with
clients who, “notwithstanding the warnings,” believed that their silence could
either be used against them as evidence of guilt or would forfeit their opportunity for pretrial release).
68. In a paper prepared for a January 25, 2003, education program for the
Law Society of Upper Canada, a Canadian criminal defense attorney instructed:
In addition to the basic advice set out above, experience suggests that
it will be helpful to the client if you go further in your discussion of
their right to remain silent. I always reinforce with clients that the
fact that they choose to remain silent cannot be introduced in evidence against them. People are always concerned that they will look
guilty if they do not talk to the police. Tell them this is not so. The
fact that they remain silent will seldom be admissible in evidence.
FLETCHER DAWSON, THE POLICE ARE ON YOUR CLIENT’S DOORSTEP: WHAT
CIVIL LITIGATORS NEED TO KNOW (2003), available at http://www
.cohenhighley.com/articles/crimlaw002.htm.
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findings suggest that the Court is incorrect in assuming that
suspects recognize and understand this “implicit” right. Suspects waive their rights and speak at a high rate in part because they fear that if they remain silent, the inference of guilt
will be drawn against them.69 This fear may constitute the type
of compulsion that the Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits. Accordingly, the warnings as currently constructed are not effective in dispelling the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation that the Court envisioned in Miranda. Whether these more
recent legal changes and modern research findings lead to the
conclusion that a new warning should be added to the Miranda
litany will be discussed in Part II.
C. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING INTERROGATIONS
As previously noted, the Miranda Court envisioned the
right to counsel warnings playing several important roles in
ensuring that coercion did not seep back into the interrogation
room as the interview progressed, so that the suspect would
have a “continuous opportunity to exercise” the right to remain
silent.70 First, the physical presence of the suspect’s own counsel would ensure that she does not become overwhelmed by the
ongoing interrogation and forget her right to remain silent or
become too intimidated to invoke it.71 Counsel would be by her
side to keep her calm and remind her of this fundamental right
when the police begin to tighten the screws. The Court also believed that the presence of a defense attorney in the interroga69. Commentator Alexander Nguyen summed up this phenomenon perfectly:
Miranda never really addressed the most important of the “inherently
compelling pressures” of police interrogations: the belief that if suspects keep quiet, they will look guilty. The root of this problem may
be in the wording of Miranda itself. The warnings indicate the consequences of talking to the police (“Anything you say may be used
against you in a court of law”). But they do not indicate the consequences of refusing to answer questions—which, in theory, should be
nothing other than the continued presumption of innocence. It may be
ignorance of this fact that causes suspects to waive their rights at
such a high rate.
Alexander Nguyen, The Assault on Miranda, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27–Apr. 10,
2000, at 61 (emphasis added); see also Timothy O’Neill, Why Miranda Does Not
Prevent Confessions: Some Lessons From Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and
Oprah Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 873 (2001) (arguing that the fact
that silence appears damning to most suspects contributes to high Miranda
warning waiver rates).
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 490 (1966).
71. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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tion room would restrain the police from engaging in thirddegree tactics, would supply the suspect with a witness to any
nefarious police conduct, and would guarantee that the suspect
gives an accurate statement that is properly memorialized,
without the police stretching it to suit their purposes.72
Thus, the Miranda Court’s analysis of the right to counsel
warnings hinged on two factual assumptions: first, that suspects would freely invoke their right to counsel, and second,
that when they did invoke their right, the police would supply
counsel to suspects and then continue the interrogations in the
presence of counsel. Indeed, none of the coercion-lessening
benefits of the right to counsel outlined by the Miranda Court
are present unless a defense attorney occupies the interrogation room with the suspect. The Miranda Court, of course, was
operating without extensive factual knowledge of how the right
to counsel warnings would operate in the real world and, thus,
was in large part speculating as to their practical effect.73
Forty years of experience has demonstrated that the
Court’s factual assumptions were incorrect. In the vast majority of interrogations in which a suspect invokes her right to
counsel, no attorney is provided. Indeed, a careful reading of
Miranda demonstrates that it does not require that an attorney
be supplied to the suspect; an attorney is mandated only if the
police wish to continue the interrogation after the suspect invokes her rights. The law enforcement community has learned
through experience that if an attorney is contacted or obtained
for the suspect, the defense attorney invariably advises the
suspect to remain silent and the interrogation ends.74 Rather

72. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
73. As described in Miranda, the FBI had been advising suspects of their
right to remain silent and right to an attorney for more than a decade prior to
the Miranda decision. 384 U.S. at 483–86. In addition, the FBI began advising
indigent suspects of their right to a state-appointed attorney two years before
Miranda was decided. Id. at 484–85. The information supplied to the Miranda
Court regarding how these warnings worked in practice suggested to the
Court that when the FBI advises a suspect of her right to remain silent and
right to an attorney, the suspect is allowed access to counsel if counsel appears
or can be reached by telephone. Id. at 485. The Miranda opinion does not address whether or not interrogation typically resumes after the suspect has
consulted with an attorney, id. at 483–86, but the Court’s analysis suggests
that the Court assumed interrogations would typically proceed with counsel
present.
74. Even a Justice of the Supreme Court has argued that any criminal defense attorney “worth his salt” will advise his client to remain silent rather
than submit to police interrogation. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
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than waste time going through the elaborate ceremony of contacting the suspect’s attorney or having an attorney appointed
for her by the court, waiting while the suspect meets with her
attorney and then announces that she will no longer submit to
interrogation, the police take the obvious shortcut and terminate the interrogation when a suspect invokes the right to
counsel, without bothering to fulfill her request for an attorney.75 In the end, a suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel
performs none of the functions intended by the Miranda Court,
but simply operates as an alternative way—in addition to in-

(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also M.K.B.
Darmer, Lessons From the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2002) (“Because counsel could be relied
upon to advise her client to demur to questioning, the Court essentially required the government to thwart its own investigations.”); Louis Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 734–35 (1992) (“Virtually
any competent lawyer would advise his client in the strongest possible terms
to remain silent, and it would be a rare client indeed who would disregard
such advice.”); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal
Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1161 n.90 (1987) (noting that Professor Anthony Amsterdam, in his treatise TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES,
§ 87 (1984), “recommends that defense counsel advise their clients at the initial interview to say nothing at all to the police or prosecuting attorneys under
any circumstances, and not to discuss the case with anyone, particularly not
cellmates, codefendants, colawyers, or reporters.”); id. at 1177 n.144 (“Naturally . . . instances of an attorney advising her accused client to participate in
an interview with law enforcement officials seeking to gain evidence
incriminating the client should be relatively rare.”); Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W.
VA. L. REV. 799, 815 (1998) (explaining that although criminal defense attorneys in Europe typically advise their clients to speak to the police, American
defense attorneys “virtually always” terminate the police interrogation). On
several occasions prior to Miranda, the Court recognized that defense attorneys summoned to the interrogation room would likely advise their clients to
terminate the interview. See Caplan, supra note 53, at 1424 (quoting several
Supreme Court opinions that made this point prior to the Miranda decision).
75. See O’Neill, supra note 69, at 874 n.100 (“In reality, the Miranda
promise of a right to counsel is somewhat illusory. If a suspect asks for counsel, police will usually end all attempts at interrogation. Since the police know
that an attorney will simply tell the suspect not to answer questions, it is easier to simply stop attempts to interrogate.”); see also Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 54, at 276–78 (reporting the results of an empirical
study showing that when a suspect invoked one or more Miranda rights, the
officer typically terminated the interrogation and returned the suspect to jail
without supplying an attorney; in a few instances, the officer continued questioning the suspect after invocation of rights without providing an attorney).
An additional reason why suspects are not provided with counsel is that in
many states no mechanism exists for obtaining counsel for indigent suspects
who have not yet been charged with a crime.

GODSEY_3FMT

2006]

04/20/2006 10:25:48 AM

REFORMULATING MIRANDA WARNINGS

799

voking the right to remain silent—for a suspect to terminate
the interrogation sans attorney.76
It is also important to consider the right to counsel warnings in the historical context in which they were created.
Miranda purported to provide suspects with a Fifth Amendment right to counsel, designed to effectuate the policies of the
Self-Incrimination Clause by ensuring that suspects have a
“continuous opportunity to exercise” the right to remain silent.77 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, on the other
hand, is a distinct right that differs in substance and policy
from the right to counsel guaranteed under Miranda and under

76. The dissenters in Miranda did not take the majority’s assertions that
counsel would be provided at face value. Justice White, joined by Justices
Harlan and Stewart, argued:
The obvious underpinning of the Court’s decision is a deep-seated distrust of all confessions. As the Court declares that the accused may
not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the
right to counsel, and as the Court all but admonishes the lawyer to
advise the accused to remain silent, the result adds up to a judicial
judgment that evidence from the accused should not be used against
him in any way, whether compelled or not. This is the not so subtle
overtone of the opinion—that it is inherently wrong for the police to
gather evidence from the accused himself.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 537–38 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissenters suggested that the Miranda majority was being disingenuous and knew, or at
least suspected, that the right to counsel warnings would not work in practice
in the manner suggested by the majority.
Professor Gerald Caplan, on the other hand, has argued:
[A]s naive as it now appears, the Court expected the presence of counsel at the station house to be routine and the waiver of rights extraordinary. The Court probably imagined that the typical suspect advised
of his rights would elect to exercise them. He would choose to speak to
counsel rather than to police, and counsel would ordinarily be provided to the indigent as an alternative to foregoing interrogation altogether. Once summoned, counsel might “advise his client not to talk
to police until he has an opportunity to investigate the case, or he
may wish to be present during any police questioning.”
Caplan, supra note 53, at 1448–49 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480); see also
Bernard Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View,
in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 179 (Claude R. Sowle ed.,
1962) (written prior to the Miranda decision and suggesting that although defense counsel would ordinarily advise his client to remain silent, it is “not unreasonable to suppose that in many cases where the suspect is innocent,” the
lawyer would participate in the interrogation with his client in the manner
that the Miranda Court later envisioned). Because this Article evaluates the
right to counsel warnings in light of the theoretical justification provided by
the Miranda majority, and evaluates that justification in light of four decades
of experience, it is imperative to take the Miranda majority’s theory at face
value to determine whether it stands the test of time.
77. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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the Self-Incrimination Clause.78 At the time of the Miranda
decision, it was unclear whether suspects had, or might eventually gain, a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at early stages
of a criminal investigation, such as the interrogation stage.
While the Court’s holding in 1964 in Escobedo v. Illinois79
hinted that the Court might eventually grant suspects that
right,80 the Miranda decision recast Escobedo as a Fifth
Amendment decision.81 Yet the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was still evolving when the Court decided Miranda,
and its application to the interrogation setting was far from
settled doctrine.
It was not until 1972, in Kirby v. Illinois,82 that the Court
finally clarified the application of the Sixth Amendment’s right
to counsel. Kirby held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered only “at or after the time that adversary judicial
criminal proceedings have been initiated against [the suspect],”
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”83 The practical effect of
this holding was to make the Sixth Amendment right to counsel inapplicable in the vast majority of Miranda-type interrogations.
With this history, it is possible to see the right to counsel
warnings in Miranda as derived from the Fifth Amendment but
created by a Court that, in 1966, perhaps envisioned a future
role of the Sixth Amendment in some investigative stages of the
criminal process. The warnings could be seen as a method of
protecting the Self-Incrimination Clause. Alternatively, if the
Court’s assumptions about how these warnings would work in
practice were incorrect, the warnings could function as a
method of giving suspects notice of their substantive, Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. If the suspect invoked her right to
counsel, and the police did not want to continue the interroga-

78. See George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986
and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 282–88 (1988) (stating
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is substantively different than the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel); see also JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS,
TRUTH, AND THE LAW 145 (1993) (discussing the differences between the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to counsel).
79. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
80. See id. at 485–91.
81. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464–66.
82. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
83. Id. at 688.
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tion in the presence of a defense attorney, the warning would
still be relevant as a formal notice of that Sixth Amendment
right. At that point, an attorney would be provided to the suspect regardless of whether or not the interrogation continued.84
The Kirby decision, however, eradicated the Sixth Amendment’s chances of landing a leading role in the investigative
stages of the criminal process. Kirby, therefore, left the SelfIncrimination Clause as the sole provision in the Bill of Rights
on which the right to counsel warnings could justify their validity. Because history has proven that these warnings do not perform their Fifth Amendment function as the Court originally
envisioned, they struggle to find legitimacy in modern application.
Whether the right to counsel warnings can still be justified
and find some validity under more modern interpretations of
Miranda and confession law, or whether the policies behind the
warnings could be better served by moving in another direction,
will be explored below in Part II.
II. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WARNINGS
A. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED UNDER
MIRANDA’S ORIGINAL COMPULSION THEORY
As stated above, the Miranda decision was grounded in the
Self-Incrimination Clause and its prohibition on police use of
“compulsion” to obtain a confession. The Court equated the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation with unconstitutional
compulsion.85 The Court advised, however, that the compulsion
could be dispelled, and custodial interrogation could ensue, if
the police first provided the suspect with the required warnings
and obtained a waiver.86

84. Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is self-executing, a
suspect would not have to request counsel to be afforded this right were the
Sixth Amendment held to apply to pretrial interrogations. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE
L.J. 259, 295 (1993) (describing the self-executing nature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
85. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–74.
86. Id. at 467–75.
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Analyzed under Miranda’s original compulsion paradigm,87
the first two warnings, relating to the right to remain silent,
continue to play the important role in dispelling the coercion
that the Miranda Court envisioned. The two right to silence
warnings help to dissipate coercion by informing the suspect of
her rights. The warnings let her know that while it may appear
that the interrogators hold all the cards, she holds a trump
card embossed with the power of the Fifth Amendment. The
first two warnings also inform her of the consequences of
speaking, so that she can make an informed choice. Certainly,
suspects today feel less pressure and are in a better position to
control their destinies in the stationhouse interrogation room
than they would be without knowing of their right to remain
silent or of the consequences of speaking.
But legal developments and empirical findings over the
past four decades demonstrate that the right to silence warnings, as currently formulated, are not completely up to the task.
Suspects are informed of their right to remain silent and the
consequences of speaking. Yet, they are not informed of the
consequences of remaining silent—even though the Court has
now expressly recognized that the choice of silence by a Mirandized suspect cannot be used as evidence of guilt.88 Thus, suspects are only partially informed of the legal consequences of
their choice to speak or remain silent. Indeed, if it is essential
that suspects know the consequences of speaking, then it is
equally essential, if not more so, that they also know that no
formal consequences will follow from their silence, and that
they can exercise that right without penalty.
The Miranda Court may have agreed with this point in
theory, but believed that the fact that silence carries no penalty
was “implicit” and thus did not need to be expressly stated.89
The Miranda Court was incorrect in this assumption. Common
sense and empirical findings support the notion that this “implicit promise” does not register with suspects, and that
suspects waive their Miranda rights at a surprisingly high rate

87. As the Supreme Court modified its interpretation of “compulsion” in
subsequent decisions, the objective compulsion test set out by the Miranda
Court has morphed into a subjective voluntariness test. See Godsey, supra
note 20, at 505–15. Part II.A considers the proposed modifications under the
original compulsion theory. Part II.B considers the proposed modifications under a voluntariness standard.
88. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
89. See 384 U.S. at 468–69.
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because they erroneously conclude that their silence will be
damning and will have penalizing implications.90 This fear of
penalty, or pressure to speak to avoid this implication, constitutes compulsion as described in Miranda.
In order to fill this glaring hole that the past four decades
have illuminated, a new right to silence warning should be
added. This warning should state something to the effect of: “If
you choose to remain silent at the beginning or at any time during the interview, your silence will not be used against you as
evidence to suggest that you committed a crime simply because
you refused to speak.”
The right to counsel warnings, on the other hand, were designed primarily to ensure that the suspect could have a champion for her rights who would keep her from becoming too intimidated to invoke her right to remain silent as the
interrogation progressed, so that she would maintain a “continuous opportunity to exercise” her right to remain silent.91
Forty years of experience has demonstrated that the right to
counsel warnings do not serve this purpose.92 Suspects who invoke the right to counsel are not supplied with an attorney, and
none of the benefits listed in the Miranda decision are realized.
The right to counsel warnings act in practice as a restatement
of the right to remain silent in a different form which, cumulative in nature with the first two warnings, offer the suspect a
second means of terminating the interrogation. None of the coercion-dispelling benefits that the Miranda Court imagined
have come to fruition in the rough-and-tumble world of the stationhouse interrogation room.
One can argue that while the right to counsel warnings
have not had their intended effect, they still work to dispel coercion in other ways.93 For example, a suspect undergoing in-

90. See supra Part I.B.2.
91. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
92. See supra Part I.C.
93. In 1965, Professor Yale Kamisar set forth an equal protection theory
for the right to counsel warnings. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to
Gideon, From Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 3–11, 64–81
(A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965); see also George C. Thomas III, Separated at
Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2001) (summarizing Kamisar’s equal protection
theory). Under Kamisar’s equal protection theory, one could arguably find a
legitimate home for the right to counsel warnings. Indeed, a wealthy suspect
undergoing custodial interrogation might more naturally request counsel on
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terrogation might not realize that her Miranda right to counsel
is in reality an empty promise, and the false belief that she has
a right to an attorney (if she so chooses) might make her feel
more confident in the interrogation room.94 Also, when a suspect invokes her right to counsel, the rules regarding when the
police can reengage the suspect are more protective than when
a suspect merely invokes the right to remain silent.95 Thus, the
her own. For example, she may have previously retained an attorney for such
occasions who had earlier advised her to “lawyer up” if the police attempt to
question her. Advising indigent suspects that they are entitled to the services
of an attorney for free, therefore, would theoretically put such suspects on
equal footing with their more affluent counterparts, because it informs them
that this possibility exists for them as well. One problem with this argument,
however, is that counsel is not in fact provided during interrogations for rich
or poor, as interrogations typically terminate when the right to counsel is invoked. The counterargument is that because wealthy suspects will often already have counsel and may have been advised to invoke that right by their
attorney, they have a greater ability to terminate interrogations through this
method than do indigent suspects to whom, without being told that the services of an attorney are free of charge, the idea of demanding the presence of
counsel might seem fanciful. Thus, Kamisar’s equal protection theory provides
some support for the right to counsel warnings.
94. See O’Neill, supra note 69, at 874 n.100 (stating that suspects are often unaware that the Miranda right to counsel is illusory, and falsely believe
that if they request an attorney, the police will provide one for them).
95. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal
for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 88–89 (1989)
(discussing varying rules for when a suspect invokes the right to counsel as
opposed to the right to silence, and stating: “Subsequent cases have, however,
treated these two prongs somewhat differently. Invocation of the right to silence has not resulted in either a per se prohibition of further interrogation or
any other measures designed to overcome the effects of continued detention
and resumption of questioning. All that appears to be necessary, at least when
the resumed questioning relates to another crime, is a renewed warning after
a relatively brief respite. When, however, the defendant asks for an attorney,
the police cannot initiate further interrogation as to either that offense or an
unrelated crime. Although it is true that the Court perhaps has been too eager
to find suspect-initiated interrogation, it also has ruled that once a suspect requests counsel, her subsequent responses cannot be used to show that the initial request for counsel was ambiguous. The difference in treatment of these
two facets of the Miranda warnings may reflect that the Miranda Court itself
was more explicit about the effect to be given a suspect's request for a lawyer,
or that the Court traditionally has been more protective of the right to counsel
than of the right to remain silent.”). In addition, one could argue that the right
to counsel warnings reduce coercion by providing the suspect with a less confrontational, and thus preferred, method of invoking the right to remain silent.
Indeed, it may be easier for some suspects to assert that they would like to
talk to an attorney rather than to simply stop talking. While this is undoubtedly a valid point, the coercion-lessening benefits of this reality are not as extensive as the Court envisioned in Miranda, and I believe that the policies behind the right to counsel warnings could be better effectuated by moving in a
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argument goes, the right to counsel warnings still provide some
protections to suspects undergoing custodial interrogation that
lessen the coercion to some degree.
One could further argue that in some rare instances when
a suspect invokes the right to counsel, an attorney is in fact
provided and the interrogation ensues with the attorney present. In those cases, the benefits of the presence of counsel delineated in Miranda are present. Indeed, if the police have a
strong case against a suspect but are interested in affording
her leniency in order to convince her to cooperate against other
potential suspects, the police may prefer to have a criminal defense attorney with her in the interrogation room. In instances
where the police and prosecutors are willing to offer immunity
or an incredible deal to a suspect if she implicates others, a
criminal defense attorney can be helpful to the police because
he will explain to the suspect that she is in a lot of trouble and
that what is being offered is too good to pass up.96
The problem with this argument in favor of the right to
counsel warnings, however, is that this same benefit could be
obtained in situations where the suspect is not warned of her
right to counsel and likewise refuses to cooperate. In such an
instance, if the police believe the suspect is making a mistake
that is not in her best interest, they can advise her that she
should get an attorney—and even obtain one for her—so that
the attorney could explain why talking might be in her best interest.97 In other words, because the police and the suspect’s
interests align in this context, the police will attempt to obtain
new direction.
96. When I served as an Assistant United States Attorney, in many instances we sought to arrest several members of a conspiracy and enlist one of
them to cooperate and testify against the others in exchange for possible leniency. In such instances, we would identify one conspirator to approach or arrest first, with the hope of convincing her to cooperate and testify against the
others or agree to record conversations with those conspirators still on the
street and unaware of the investigation. When that scenario presented itself,
we often invited the suspect to request counsel as soon as we approached her
or as soon as she indicated an unwillingness to cooperate. When the incriminating evidence against this suspect was revealed to her defense counsel,
along with the government’s willingness to “cut a deal” with her in exchange
for cooperation, defense counsel almost invariably recognized that waiving
Miranda rights and cooperating with the government was in the client’s best
interest. Thus, the presence of counsel worked in favor of both the suspect and
the prosecution.
97. Indeed, when the scenario described in the preceding footnote occurred, the government would often have a prearranged plan to invite the
suspect to invoke counsel, as the presence of counsel was seen as beneficial.
Thus, suspects will be provided with counsel in these situations regardless of
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interests align in this context, the police will attempt to obtain
an attorney for the suspect regardless of whether or not she has
been advised of her right to counsel.
The fact remains, however, that in most interrogation scenarios, the right to counsel warnings provide none of their intended benefits, and most of the unintended coercion-lessening
benefits provided by the warnings are minimal or speculative
at best.98 The Miranda Court required the right to counsel
warnings primarily because the presence of counsel would ensure that suspects undergoing custodial interrogation have a
“continuous opportunity to exercise” the right to remain silent.99 This policy interest could perhaps be more effectively
achieved when analyzed under a “compulsion” analysis of
Miranda by replacing the right to counsel warnings with a new
warning: “If you choose to talk, you may change your mind and
remain silent at any time, even if you have already spoken.”
This warning directly informs the suspect that just because she
has decided to talk, that fact does not mean she cannot invoke
her right to silence later if she begins to feel uncomfortable
with the direction of the interrogation. This warning would, in
part, play the role that her attorney would play in the interrogation room by reminding her that she can invoke her right to
silence even after she has given a partial statement. The need
for such a warning is so apparent that even some law enforcement agencies have recognized its absence from the Miranda
equation, and have recited a warning of this nature to suspects
even though they are not required to do so by law.100
whether the police are required by law to advise them of their right to counsel,
as it is in the best interest of the police to do so.
98. The strict rules regarding reinitiating interrogation when a suspect
invokes the right to counsel are substantial, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 484–85 (1981), but these rules would still apply when the suspect is advised only that she has a right to remain silent but nevertheless asks for an
attorney. Indeed, suspects ask for attorneys in some instances even when not
advised of that right. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479–82
(1964) (involving a suspect who requested counsel during interrogation even
though he was not advised of that right).
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
100. For example, in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), the officer
in question used a standard waiver form created by his local police department
which informed suspects that they could stop answering questions at any
time, even if they had already answered some questions. Id. at 198. In addition, a prominent web-based company that sells equipment to police departments across the country advertises a “virtually indestructible” Miranda
warning card which includes this “fifth” and additional warning: “You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make
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The coercion could be further dispelled if the police were
required to remind her of her right to silence and her right to
terminate questioning at any time at intervals throughout the
interrogation. A rule could be constructed that would require
the police to obtain a written waiver of the right to remain silent, for example, at the beginning of each hour of interrogation. The suspect and the interrogator would sign the waiver
form at the beginning of the interrogation, and each would
place their initials next to the time of day at each interval at
which the re-recitation of the rights took place.101 This procedure would be far more effective in ensuring that suspects have
a “continuous right to exercise” their right to remain silent
throughout the duration of the interrogation than the illusory
right to counsel warnings. While perhaps not as effective as
having her own attorney remind her of this right at periodic intervals, the reality is that defense attorneys do not perform this
function as Miranda currently operates.102 A requirement that
the interrogation must have periodic breaks where the suspect
is reminded of her rights would reinforce the notion that she
can invoke her right to silence at any time, and provide her
with orchestrated lulls in the action. During these breaks, the
suspect could collect her thoughts and reconsider her initial decision to talk.
In addition to ensuring that the suspect has a continuous
right to exercise the right to remain silent, the Miranda Court
listed some secondary functions of the right to counsel warnany statements.” Advertisement, Chief Supply, Miranda Warning Card,
www.chiefsupply.com/miranda.phtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). The standard
Miranda card used by the FBI includes a similar warning: “If you decide to
answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time.” See F.B.I. Advice of Rights Form FD-395 (Feb. 28, 1997)
(on file with author).
101. Most law enforcement agencies have preprinted cards containing the
Miranda warnings. When a suspect is Mirandized, an officer reads the warnings on the card to her, and if the suspect wishes to waive her rights and answer questions, she is required to sign and date the card. Because this procedure is already in widespread use across the country, it would not be difficult
to add a requirement that the suspect place her initials and time of day on the
card to verify the additional times during the interrogation at which she was
re-advised of her rights.
102. An obvious alternative to the procedures set forth herein that might
fulfill policies behind the right to counsel warnings would be to require police
to actually provide attorneys to suspects during all custodial interrogations.
Because such a rule would so significantly undermine the ability of the police
to conduct interrogations, I do not consider this option to be a politically realistic alternative.
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ings. Namely, that law enforcement officers would be less likely
to engage in third-degree tactics if a criminal defense attorney
were present; that if officers did engage in such conduct, the defense attorney would be a witness to it; and finally, that the defense attorney could ensure that his client gave an accurate
statement to the police and that the officers properly memorialized what was said, rather than spinning it in a way more helpful to their case.103 Again, the right to counsel warnings do not
perform these intended functions, as the notion of counsel being
present in the interrogation room has proved an illusory concept in practice.104
These subsidiary functions of the right to counsel warnings
could be achieved, however, by prophylactically requiring the
police to videotape custodial interrogations.105 Police officers
would obviously be less likely to engage in third-degree tactics
if they knew their conduct was being recorded and might be
viewed by a judge or jury at a later time.106 In addition, a videotape of the interrogation would be the best evidence of exactly
what the suspect said during the interrogation, leaving no room
for creative interpretation.107

103. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
104. Another obvious option to cure this problem would be to actually require the physical presence of defense counsel, either by the Fifth or Sixth
Amendments, in the interrogation room during all custodial interrogations.
Although this is certainly a defensible alternative, it would essentially signal
the end of custodial interrogation in this country. Because custodial interrogation, when executed properly, is a very important tool for solving serious
crimes, I would not support this alternative. Nor do I think that it is remotely
feasible from a political standpoint. The Warren Court was not willing to go
that route in Miranda, and the current Court certainly would not either. Thus,
I recognize this option as a viable alternative but make the assumption in this
Article that it is not a realistic option at the present time.
105. This requirement could be created as a prophylactic rule to enforce the
Self-Incrimination Clause, or as a requirement of substantive due process. See
Leo, supra note 2, at 681–92 (arguing that substantive due process requires
videotaped interrogations).
106. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395,
417 (2005); see also Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons
of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L.
REV. 619, 628 (2004) (suggesting that the videotaping requirement would force
police to “keep their own behavior in check”); Leo, supra note 2, at 683
(asserting that police officers would “be more self-conscious about their conduct” were interrogations videotaped).
107. See Moreno, supra note 106, at 417 (stating that “[J]udges will make
more accurate pretrial decisions when they can examine the most objective
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Videotaping interrogations was not a realistic possibility at
the time Miranda was decided but, of course, it is today.108
While a videotaping requirement raises its own issues such as
cost and practicality, several states have adopted this requirement through legislation or court decision,109 and many more
states are currently considering bills mandating taped interrogations.110 While an exploration of precisely how a videotaping
requirement would work would be an article in and of itself and
thus is beyond the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that
videotaping has been successfully employed in several states
and, when administered with flexibility, has proven to be a
helpful solution that would nicely complement the proposals set
forth in this Article. Indeed, the proposed modifications to the
Miranda warnings set forth herein, when coupled with a requirement for videotaped interrogations, satisfy the various
policy objectives underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause that
the Miranda Court unsuccessfully attempted to achieve.
In sum, when analyzed through the lens of Miranda’s
original compulsion theory, and in light of legal developments

and comprehensive factual evidence available,” and that “[v]ideotapes . . . reduce or eliminate problems of biased testimony, faulty or incomplete memories, and influential factors such as inflection and body language that cannot
be transcribed.”); see also Drizin & Reich, supra note 106, at 622–28 (discussing procedural and evidentiary advantages of taped interrogations requirement); Leo, supra note 2, at 681–92 (discussing benefits of videotaped interrogation requirement).
108. See Moreno, supra note 106, at 417 (“Obviously, neither the Framers,
nor the Warren Court, could have anticipated the myriad technological developments that have transformed criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Videotape recorders provide a simple, inexpensive mechanism that, in effect,
can expose the actions of the police by transporting a judge back in time, enabling her to watch the interrogation.”); see also Leo, supra note 2, at 681–82
(discussing fact that police departments already have the technological capability to videotape interrogations). State legislatures and scholars have debated the various issues that arise with videotaping, such as cost and the
availability (or lack thereof ) of video cameras during unanticipated or emergency questioning of suspects. See Leo, supra note 2, at 684–86 (discussing
and rejecting various arguments against videotaping interrogations).
109. See Moreno, supra note 106, at 418 & nn.195–200 (observing that
mandatory videotaping of all custodial interrogations is required in Alaska
and Minnesota by judicial decision, and that recording of certain types of interrogations is required in Illinois, Maine, Texas, and the District of Columbia
by statute).
110. See id. at 418 & nn.176–94 (noting nineteen states that introduced
bills mandating videotaping and/or audiotaping of interrogations in 2004 and
2005); see also Drizin & Reich, supra note 106, at 639–45 (discussing the growing trend of jurisdictions requiring videotaped interrogations).
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and knowledge gained over the past four decades, the Miranda
warnings have not achieved their stated goals. Suspects waive
their rights and talk to the police at a surprisingly high rate
because the inherent compulsion has not been fully dispelled.
The Miranda Court mistakenly believed that what it later
called an “implicit promise”—that the decision to remain silent
carries no penalty—would register with suspects, but history
has proven that it does not. In order to effectuate the intended
purpose of the warnings, a new warning should be added which
expressly advises suspects that their silence carries no penalty.
In addition, the right to counsel warnings do not perform
their intended function. The policies underlying these warnings
could be better served by: (1) informing the suspect that she
can choose to remain silent at any time, even after she has
started talking to the police; (2) requiring interrogators to
reinform the suspect of her rights at periodic intervals during
lengthy interrogations; and (3) requiring that the police videotape custodial interrogations.
B. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED UNDER
THE DUE PROCESS VOLUNTARINESS THEORY
In previous articles, I have thoroughly documented how
the Court, in the last four decades, has slowly moved away
from Miranda’s original compulsion theory as the underlying
justification for the warnings.111 Instead of requiring the warnings to dispel inherent coercion as described in the Miranda decision, the Court now uses the warnings as a prophylactic rule
to make easier the task of determining the “voluntariness” of a
confession in the due process sense of that term.112 If Miranda
warnings were provided and waived prior to the confession, the
confession is seen as presumptively voluntary.113 If warnings
were not provided and waived, then the confession is consid-

111. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1734–52; Godsey, supra note 20, at 505–
15; Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S.
Investigators from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 863–67 (2003).
112. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 505–15.
113. Id. at 513 & n.267 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433
n.20 (1984), for its observation that “[c]ases in which a defendant can make a
colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare”).
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ered involuntary and inadmissible.114 In other words, the Court
has unmoored the warnings from the Miranda concept of compulsion, and now considers them a first-step litmus test for determining the voluntariness of a confession.115
The voluntariness test that now underpins the warnings
has been described by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.116 The test considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a suspect’s will was overborne
by police conduct.117 It is a highly subjective test that considers
not only the governmental conduct involved, but characteristics
unique to the suspect, such as age, background, strength of
character, and mental condition at the time.118 The primary focus of the test is on the state of mind of the suspect. Objective
factors, such as the pressure applied by the police, are relevant,
but only in respect to the effect such pressures had on the mind
of the particular suspect under interrogation.119 Theoretically,
therefore, a particularly hearty suspect could be deemed to
have made a voluntary statement in the face of enormous pressure, while a particularly weak suspect could be deemed to
have made an involuntary statement in response to much
lighter pressures.120
Despite this change in underlying rationale, the Court has
not reconsidered whether the warnings fit with, and are appropriate for, the voluntariness test it now espouses. Stated another way, the warnings were designed with a specific compulsion theory in mind, as delineated in the Miranda decision. The
compulsion theory of Miranda was objective in nature,121 and
the Miranda Court arrived at its warnings by merely adopting
114. See id. at 508.
115. Id.
116. 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973).
117. Id. at 225; see also Godsey, supra note 20, at 468–69. See generally
Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997) (discussing
the history of the privilege and the involuntary confession rule).
118. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; see also Godsey, supra note 20, at 468–
69.
119. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 491.
120. See Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 755–57 (1963) (“For if the Court means what it has said on a
number of occasions, the ‘voluntariness’ test causes constitutionally permissible police interrogation to vary widely, according to the particular defendant
concerned.”).
121. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 502.
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verbatim the set of warnings that the FBI had started providing to suspects two years prior to its decision.122 While the test
underlying the warnings has morphed through time from an
objective compulsion standard to a highly subjective, allencompassing voluntariness test, the Court has not addressed
whether this transformation should carry with it a modification
of the warnings to better serve the new standard that the
warnings are now intended to complement.
The purpose of this Part, therefore, is to consider how the
warnings might be reconstructed if the Court were to start
from scratch and design them with a subjective voluntariness
test rather than objective, Miranda-style compulsion as the
underlying touchstone.
In the voluntariness paradigm, the recitation and waiver of
Miranda warnings creates a presumption that the resulting
confession was voluntary. In order for courts administering this
presumption to have confidence that the warning-and-waiver
procedure actually leads to voluntary confessions in most instances—thus making this presumption sound and meaningful—a logical connection should exist between the concept of
voluntariness and the content of the warnings themselves. In
other words, a prophylactic warning system designed to ensure
voluntariness should be designed in large part to remove from
consideration the factors that might cause a suspect to speak
involuntarily. If a court knows that the warnings have rendered those considerations irrelevant, it can then feel confident
that the resulting confession was made voluntarily.
To be effective, therefore, the warnings should rid the suspect’s mind of pressures that she fears might be lurking, but
that will not come to pass because of her constitutional rights.
At the outset of custodial interrogation, a suspect might have
fears that, if not relieved, could substantially contribute to an
involuntary confession during the course of an interrogation.
Examples include: What will happen if I talk? What will happen if I refuse to talk? Will I be tortured? Must I answer questions because I will be presumed guilty if I refuse? If I start to
talk, am I stuck talking, or can I change my mind later? If I
talk, will the police be able to twist my words and claim I said
something that I didn’t really say? If I don’t talk, will they
question me for hours on end until I tell them what they want
to hear? If the police do something bad to me like hit me or de122. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483–86 (1966).
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prive me of food to get me to talk, will they be able to get away
with it because it will be my word against their word?
The voluntariness test is so broad that no list of uninformed fears could be complete or tailored to fit the unique vulnerabilities of each suspect.123 Nevertheless, a prophylactic rule
designed to promote voluntariness should be designed to alleviate as many of these ill-founded fears as reasonably possible.
Doing so would permit courts deciding the admissibility of a
confession applying a voluntariness test to feel comfortable that
the suspect spoke from her own free will and not as a result of
these hypothetical fears having overborne her will in cases
where warnings were administered and waived. With this goal
in mind, this Article proposes the following warnings as illustrative of one potential set of warnings that would more accurately trigger the presumption of voluntariness than the current warnings:
Introductory Remarks
You have a number of important constitutional rights that protect
you when law enforcement officers ask questions of you. These rights
ensure that police interviews are conducted in a civilized and humane
manner and that if you talk, it is a choice made by you on your own
free will.
The Right to Remain Silent
First and foremost, you have a right to remain silent. This means,
of course, that you do not have to talk to us.
Implications of Remaining Silent
If you choose to remain silent at the beginning or at any time during the interview, you will not be penalized in any way for doing so.
You will not be physically harmed or punished, you will not be deprived of any benefits or privileges, and your silence will not be used
against you in court to suggest that you have something to hide and
must therefore be guilty.
Implications of Talking
If you choose to talk, anything you say will be used against you in
a court of law. If you choose to talk, you may change your mind and
remain silent at any time. In other words, we will honor your request
to remain silent at any time, and this interview will last no longer
than you wish it to last. We also, as required by law, have already
started videotaping our entire interview with you, and this tape will
be admissible in a court of law by you or by law enforcement to prove
what was said and what happened during this interview.

From the outset, it is important to note the absence of right
to counsel warnings in this hypothetical set of warnings. While
123. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 468–70 (describing the breadth of the
voluntariness test).
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the right to counsel warnings may have a civilized and “feel
good” quality to them, they do not, as discussed above in Part
I.C, play a significant role in practice.124 While including right
to counsel warnings would not undermine the policies of the
voluntariness test, the policies underlying these warnings could
be better supported in other ways, as described below.125
The first category of warnings above consists of introductory remarks summarizing the applicable rights in plain and
clear language. Indeed, if ensuring voluntariness is the goal of
the warnings, a suspect should be advised at the outset that
the interrogation will be conducted in a civilized and humane
manner, and that she need answer questions only if she decides
to answer on her own free will. This statement would set the
proper tone and inform the suspect that the police will act in a
professional manner. Moreover, this introductory statement is
helpful because it is not couched in terms of “rights” or legal
jargon, as are the remaining warnings, but acts as an easily
understandable summary of the more detailed warnings to follow. This statement, therefore, acts in a straightforward way to
relieve fears of improper coercion, setting the stage for a discussion in which the suspect will be able to speak on her own
free will if and when she decides to talk.
The next warning advises the suspect of her right to remain silent and is followed by two additional warnings that explain what it means to say that silence is a “right.” The third
warning, therefore, provides a complete description of the consequences, or lack thereof, of choosing to remain silent. Regarding silence, this warning should fully disabuse the suspect of
the notion that she will be penalized if she chooses to remain
silent, thus removing this instinctual fear that research has
shown is ever present in her mind. Rather than leaving the
suspect guessing as to what a “right to remain silent” means,
the warnings should adequately explain, in plain language,
what it means to say that her choice to remain silent is a
124. I am by no means hostile to the inclusion of right to counsel warnings
in Miranda’s prophylactic structure. However, if one applies the same scrutiny
to the right to counsel warnings that one does when considering whether new
warnings should be added, the weight of the arguments leans against their
inclusion. As a compromise, I would agree to remove the right to counsel warnings in exchange for adding the modifications to the warnings proposed in this
Article.
125. For an argument that the right to counsel warnings could be supported under an equal protection theory, see supra note 93. See supra note 104
for a discussion of another alternative.
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“right.” She will not be tortured, she will not lose benefits or
privileges, and her silence will not be used against her in court.
In the same vein, the warnings proceed in the next section
to fully advise the suspect of what will happen if, on the other
hand, she chooses to speak. She must be informed at the outset
that her statements can be used against her in a court of law,
so that she understands the implications of her choice. The
warnings must continue by informing her that if she chooses to
speak, she can still invoke her right to silence at any time
thereafter as the interview progresses. This statement, coupled
with a requirement that the police repeat the warnings at periodic intervals during lengthy interrogations, would help play
the role that defense counsel would play if present. This procedure would protect against her will becoming overborne as the
interrogation progresses and as the initial warnings fade into
the recesses of her mind.
Finally, the police should be required to videotape the interrogation and inform the suspect that if she speaks, the entire interview will be recorded. A suspect who knows that the
interrogation is being videotaped and that the videotape will be
admissible in court, will have substantially less fear that the
police will engage in third-degree tactics, and will know that
her statement will be accurately recorded. Because the voluntariness test considers the totality of the circumstances, videotaping provides the perfect prophylactic safeguard, as it captures the nuances and subtleties of interrogations that courts
currently struggle to reconstruct at suppression hearings.
The hypothetical set of warnings above illustrates that because of the voluntariness test’s breadth, a wide variety of
warnings could be considered as part of a warnings requirement. The set of warnings constructed above is by no means intended to represent the ultimate solution to the voluntariness
quagmire.
Whether or not the Court ever completely reconstructs the
warnings in a manner similar to the hypothetical warnings
suggested above, the specific modifications this Article suggests
are helpful to a voluntariness analysis. For example, informing
a suspect that her silence will not be used against her directly
supports the goal of a voluntariness standard. Just as fear of a
penalty for remaining silent could constitute compulsion, a
suspect’s erroneous fear that she must speak or she will otherwise be damned could be an important factor that, along with
other pressures, could easily cause a suspect to speak involun-
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tarily. Informing a suspect that her silence will not be used in
this manner, therefore, removes that factor from consideration.
The presumption of voluntariness that is currently made with
the recitation and waiver of Miranda warnings would be more
complete and sound were this warning added to the litany.
The remaining modifications, for the reasons stated, also
do a better job of capturing the policies and concerns of the voluntariness test than do the current Miranda warnings. Courts
employing this updated version of the warnings, including a
videotaping requirement, could feel more confident that after
these warnings have been provided to a suspect and waived,
the presumption of voluntariness that attaches to the resulting
confession is more clearly and logically justified than the same
presumption that arises under the current rendition of the
warnings.
In sum, the current warnings were designed with an objective compulsion theory in mind, and the Miranda Court essentially copied verbatim the warnings that the FBI had been using for two years prior to its decision. The Court at that time
did not create the warnings with the all-encompassing, highly
subjective voluntariness test in mind that it now employs. The
modifications to the prophylactic warning procedure proposed
in this Article would be better suited to trigger the voluntariness presumption than the outdated warnings currently in use.
C. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ON THE WARNINGS
ANALYZED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS NOTICE THEORY
Leading Miranda scholar George C. Thomas III has argued
that the Miranda warnings are presently best justified under
the Fourteenth Amendment “due process notice” cases.126 Thomas argues that in many instances the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the government to provide
notice to citizens before it attempts to deprive them of a liberty
interest.127 Thomas further argues that suspects have a liberty
interest in not being subjected to custodial interrogation and a
separate liberty interest in making an informed choice as to
126. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1091, 1112–17. Examples of Fourteenth
Amendment “due process notice” cases that Thomas refers to include Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See
Thomas, supra note 93, at 1109 n.127, 1113 nn.145–46, 1114 n.147.
127. Thomas, supra note 93, at 1091, 1113–14.
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whether to answer police questions.128 Because the SelfIncrimination Clause is not self-implementing, the due process
notice cases require the government to (1) warn a suspect of
rights relevant to custodial interrogation that are found within,
or derived as prophylactic rules from, provisions in the Bill of
Rights, and (2) provide her with sufficient information about
those rights and rules so that she can invoke them and effectively contest the deprivation of a liberty interest if she so desires.129
Although Thomas argues that the due process notice cases
provide the best justification for the Miranda warnings, he has
not yet deeply delved into the issue of whether the content of
the warnings should change were the Court to openly adopt
this theory.130 An adoption of the due process notice doctrine for
Miranda, however, would certainly require a reformulation of
the warnings tailored to fit that theory. Indeed, the current
warnings are not up-to-date because they fail to adequately apprise suspects of all the applicable rights and prophylactic rules
of custodial interrogation, some of which were not recognized
until after the warnings were originally crafted. Nor do the current warnings provide suspects with sufficient information to
make an “informed choice,” as the consequences of remaining
silent, for example, have been clarified post-Miranda without
updating the warnings to reflect such change.
Viewed through this due process notice theory lens, it is
clear that a suspect would need to be notified at the outset, as
the Miranda warnings currently do, of her right to remain silent under the Self-Incrimination Clause. In addition, however,
in order to make an informed choice as to whether she should
speak or remain silent, the warnings would need to adequately
128. Id. at 1112–14; see also Susan R. Klein, Miranda’s Exceptions in a
Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 570–72 (2001)
(summarizing and challenging Thomas’s due process notice theory). Thomas
also identifies a third liberty interest relevant to custodial interrogation: the
right not to reveal secrets to the police. Thomas, supra note 93, at 1114–15.
129. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1113–14 (discussing the fact that the
due process notice cases require not only notice of rights, but also require the
state to convey sufficient information about those rights for citizens to make
an informed choice as to whether to challenge a deprivation of a liberty interest). For a thoughtful critique of Thomas’s due process notice theory, see
Klein, supra note 128, at 568–96.
130. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1113–14 (recognizing that the content
of the warnings might differ under a due process notice theory, but arguing,
without significant discussion, that at a minimum the current warnings can be
justified on that theory).
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advise her of the consequences of both choices, an objective that
the Miranda warnings currently do not achieve. Thus, warnings created under this theory might provide:
You have a right to remain silent. If you choose to talk, anything you
say can and will be used against you in a court of law. If you choose to
talk, you may change your mind and remain silent at any time. If you
choose to remain silent, on the other hand, you will not be penalized
in any way. You will not be physically harmed or punished; you will
not be deprived of any benefits or privileges; and your silence will not
be used against you as evidence to suggest that you committed a
crime simply because you refused to speak.

Each of the “rights” above have been included in the hypothetical warnings because they are actual rights derived from
the Court’s interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, and
thus would fall within the notification requirements of the due
process notice cases. The first sentence, “You have a right to
remain silent,” is a notification of the core right in the SelfIncrimination Clause.131 The second sentence educates the suspect of the consequences of speaking so that she can make an
informed choice—also a requirement of Thomas’s due process
notice theory. The third sentence informs the suspect that
speaking does not waive the right to remain silent, and can be
invoked at any time. This warning also reflects a core rule that
the Court has derived from the Self-Incrimination Clause.132
The remaining language informs the suspect of the consequences (or lack thereof) of remaining silent. As described in
detail above,133 clear recognition that a suspect would suffer no
penalty for remaining silent did not come until several years
after Miranda was decided, and was not at that time added to
the litany because the Court erroneously believed that it was
“implicit” in the warnings.134 Because this right clearly exists
now and empirical findings suggest that it is not, from the perspective of most suspects, “implicit” in the warnings, it would
be required under a due process notice theory so that the suspect could make an informed choice as to whether to challenge
the deprivation of a liberty interest by invoking her right to
remain silent.
The right to counsel warnings would not be included in the
litany under a due process notice theory for several reasons.

131.
132.
133.
134.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).
See id.
See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
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First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel no longer applies
during most interrogations.135 Thus, no notice is required in
connection with that specific provision. Second, no actual Fifth
Amendment right to counsel exists during custodial interrogation even under a Miranda compulsion theory because invocation of the right to counsel works to terminate the interrogation
rather than to supply the suspect with counsel.136 Third, while
the Court has retained the right to counsel warnings to date
because it has not attempted to revamp the warnings in light of
modern developments, the Court has undermined the “compulsion” theory that originally justified these warnings.137 In addition, were the Court to reconsider the issue anew, the warnings
would not be required under the current voluntariness standard that now underlies the warnings.138 Finally, if the Court
openly endorsed a due process notice theory to Miranda, the
“compulsion” theory that originally justified the right to counsel
during interrogations would be a dead letter, and such right to
counsel would not be one of the existing rights for which notice
is required.139 Thus, because the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel is illusory in practice, no longer finds clear validity in
constitutional doctrine, and would be completely uprooted if the
Court adopted a due process notice approach to Miranda while
abandoning the compulsion theory that originally justified the
right to counsel warnings, no warning relating to the right to
counsel would be required.140
Thus far, all of the modifications suggested in this Article
except two—the requirement to repeat the warnings at periodic
intervals throughout lengthy interrogations and the requirement to videotape interrogations—would be implemented under a due process notice theory. At the present time, however,
neither of these two remaining rules has been found by the

135. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
139. If the Court fully abandoned the compulsion and voluntariness theories and instead adopted a pure due process notice theory, the original “compulsion dispelling” justification for the warnings described in Miranda would
no longer be applicable. See Klein, supra note 128, at 571–72 (arguing that
Thomas’s theory requires an abandonment of the compulsion and voluntariness rationales of Miranda).
140. But see Thomas, supra note 93, at 1113 (stating, without discussion,
that the right to counsel warnings would be included under a due process notice theory).
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Court to derive from any provision in the Bill of Rights applicable to interrogations. Accordingly, they would not be part of a
notice-based warning system. In the future, however, the Court
could require these procedures under the Self-Incrimination
Clause or notions of substantive due process.141 If the Court
were to rethink the prophylactic rules necessary to more effectively implement the voluntariness test, for example, these requirements would be logical additions to the mix for the reasons discussed in Part II.B.
In sum, nearly all of the modifications suggested in this
Article find support under Thomas’s due process notice theory
of Miranda. Regardless of whether the Court justifies the warnings on a theory of compulsion, voluntariness, or due process
notice, a substantial modification of the warnings is presently
called for to bring them in line with contemporary law and understanding.
D. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED UNDER
THE OBJECTIVE PENALTIES THEORY
In a pair of recent articles, I set forth yet another modern
justification for the Self-Incrimination Clause and Miranda
warnings.142 An analysis of the historical origins, text, and policies of the Self-Incrimination Clause suggests that it should be
interpreted to ban police imposition of “objective penalties” on
suspects to provoke speech or punish silence.143 A complete description of the objective penalties test has been provided in
prior articles and thus need not be rehashed in full here.144 In
short, an objective penalty is defined as any act or threat by the
officer that changes a suspect’s preinterrogation baseline or
status quo to her detriment, if done by the officer to punish silence or provoke speech.145 For example, depriving a suspect of
food or water, taking away her cigarettes, or even threatening
to remove her child from her custody could constitute an objec-

141. Professor Leo has argued, for example, that videotaped interrogation
should be made a requirement of substantive due process. See Leo, supra note
2, at 681–92. In addition, Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued that a
videotaping requirement could be mandated under the Due Process Clause,
the Self-Incrimination Clause, or the Confrontation Clause. See Christopher
Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 309–22 (2003).
142. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1735–52; Godsey, supra note 20 passim.
143. See Godsey, supra note 20 passim.
144. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1735–52; Godsey, supra note 20 passim.
145. Godsey, supra note 20, at 515–40.
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tive penalty if the circumstances indicate that it was done by
the officer to provoke speech or punish silence.146 This standard
is derived in large part through application of the “formal setting” cases,147 which establish that any penalty imposed on a
suspect to provoke speech or punish silence violates the SelfIncrimination Clause, as it is inconsistent with a true right to
remain silent.148
While the Court has at various times supported an objective penalties test for the Self-Incrimination Clause, its application has not been adopted in the interrogation context.149 If
this standard were adopted, however, Miranda-style warnings
would play an important role in administering the test.150 Although I have delineated the objective penalties test and described the general purpose of the warnings in prior articles, I
have not yet addressed whether the content of the warnings
would be modified were the Court to adopt this theory of constitutional confession law.151 This Article presents the perfect opportunity to do so.
Simply stated, an objective penalties test would require a
set of warnings that would enable a suspect to maintain her
status quo with the police and thereby ensure that the interrogation itself does not become a penalty. Specifically, warnings
would be employed as a prophylactic measure to ensure that
the act of interrogation itself does not constitute an objective
penalty.152 The most obvious and frequent way in which the act
of interrogation itself would constitute a penalty is when an interrogator continues to press the suspect for a particular answer that the suspect is unwilling to provide.153 When this occurs, the officer’s persistent questioning might cause the
suspect to believe that she must answer the officer’s questions

146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
148. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 492–95, 515–40.
149. Id. at 492–95, 516–17 (discussing a single case, Garrity, 385 U.S. 493,
496–500 (1967), in which the Court seemed to apply the objective penalties
test in the interrogation context).
150. Id. at 528–30.
151. Id. at 530 n.320 (leaving open for a future article the question of what
form the warnings would take under the objective penalties test).
152. Id. at 529–30.
153. Id. at 528.
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in the desired manner or face uninterrupted harassment.154
This restraint on freedom would be a penalty imposed by the
officer in response to the suspect’s exercise of her constitutional
right to remain silent.155
To avoid this scenario, therefore, the warnings must make
clear to the suspect at the outset that she has a right to remain
silent, and that she can cut off questioning at any time and end
the interview. This warning protects against the suspect choosing to talk simply to avoid the penalty of liberty-restraining
pressure from the officer.156
In addition, because a reasonable suspect might fear that if
she remains silent she will be penalized, the warnings must
disabuse her of that notion. Absent the officer conveying this
specific information, the suspect may talk for fear of a future
penalty, such as physical abuse or the prosecution using her silence to infer guilt at trial. At the outset, therefore, the warnings would need to provide:
You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. If you choose to talk, you may
change your mind and stop talking at any time. If you choose to remain silent at the beginning or at any time during the interview, you
will not be penalized or deprived of your rights in any way as a result
of that choice. You will not be physically harmed or punished, you will
not be deprived of any benefits or privileges, and your silence will not
be used against you as evidence to suggest that you committed a
crime simply because you refused to speak.

The remaining modifications to the warnings suggested in
this Article would also be imperative for effective implementation of the objective penalties test. For example, creating a prophylactic rule that police officers must re-advise the suspect at

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 528–30. Under an objective penalties test:
Miranda warnings might not be required per se, but their application
would be at the officer’s discretion when he or she perceived the act of
interrogation might begin to resemble a penalty. Because the officer
who refrained from providing Miranda warnings in such a case would
assume the risk that a court will later find that a penalty was
imposed, the practice would certainly develop that officers would routinely provide Miranda warnings at the outset of almost any interrogation to be on the safe side. However, this flexible rule would free officers from having to provide the warnings in certain circumstances
where it is not practicable or where they intend to ask only a few
questions without pressuring the suspect or changing the suspect’s
baseline in any way.
Id. at 529 n.317.
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periodic intervals throughout lengthy interrogations would ensure that the suspect has a “continuous opportunity to exercise”
her right to remain silent. If she starts to feel intimidated or
unsure of her ability to control her destiny in the interrogation
room as the interview progresses, a reaffirmation of her unfettered ability to reinstate her preinterrogation status quo by invoking her right to silence would ensure that the act of interrogation itself does not begin to resemble a penalty. As a
prophylactic rule, this requirement would directly support and
reinforce the Self-Incrimination Clause’s ban on “objective penalties.”157
A prophylactic videotaping requirement would also be appropriate for an objective penalties test. Under the voluntariness test, as currently implemented, courts assume that a confession was made voluntarily if the Miranda warnings were
provided and waived. As a result, courts provide very little
oversight as to what goes on during interrogations after the
Miranda waiver has been obtained.158 The objective penalties
test, however, requires courts to scrutinize an interrogator’s
157. Although it has been included in the above recitation of warnings, it is
difficult to justify the warning, “Anything you say can and will be used against
you in a court of law,” under the objective penalties test. Perhaps the best argument for including this warning in the litany is that if a suspect is not advised of the consequences of speaking, she might choose to speak out of ignorance and thus provide evidence of guilt to the prosecution and, in the process,
change her status quo to her detriment. Thus, the act of interrogation might
constitute a penalty without this warning, as it would place her in a situation
where severe consequences might follow, and where she is not armed with sufficient information to make a decision as to how to maintain her status quo
vis-à-vis the state.
158. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 497 n.9
(2002) (citing a number of scholars in support of the proposition that “[i]t is
now widely recognized that when the police follow Miranda’s procedural instructions by administering the warnings and obtaining a waiver, Miranda
serves as a license, rather than an impediment, to secure usable confessions.”);
Godsey, supra note 20, at 513; Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733, 752–54 (1987) (providing five examples of cases where courts have
admitted involuntary confessions into evidence in marginal cases); William J.
Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) (noting that
courts may tolerate more coercion because the burden is on defendants who
have waived their rights to show they did not understand the warnings);
Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1220 (2001) (“A finding that the police have properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights . . . often has the effect of
minimizing or eliminating scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation practices.”).
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conduct throughout the entirety of an interrogation to determine whether a penalty was imposed at any time.159 In some
instances, this scrutiny requires knowledge of the precise
statements made by the interrogator to the suspect to determine whether the interrogator threatened the suspect with a
negative penalty, or, on the other hand, merely offered her a
benefit in exchange for a confession.160 Therefore, a videotaping
requirement would be an essential prophylactic rule to effectively administer the Self-Incrimination Clause’s objective penalties test. Instead of litigating a “swearing contest” between
the police officer and the suspect concerning what happened in
the interrogation room,161 the court would have a clean record
in the form of a video recording to efficiently resolve the factual
disputes that naturally arise under this test.
Similar to the other theories explored in this Article, the
right to counsel warnings would not be required in the objective
penalties rubric. The objective penalties test does not attempt
to measure the subjective state of mind of individual suspects
under interrogation,162 so the hypothetical coercion-lessening
effects of the right to counsel warnings would not be relevant.
While a suspect might assume that the interrogator will prohibit her from bringing her attorney into the interrogation
room, this assumption does not constitute a penalty imposed by
the interrogator to provoke speech or punish silence if the interrogator has done nothing to instill this fear. Indeed, if the
interrogator has provided the suspect with the hypothetical
warnings provided above and complies with the procedure set
forth herein, then the suspect has been fully equipped with the
ability to maintain her status quo. If she does not wish to speak
for any reason—from a desire to have her attorney present to a
desire to finish her dinner prior to talking—then she may cut
off questioning without penalty.163 The warnings designed
herein are sufficiently broad to ensure that the suspect is fully
aware that she is in the driver’s seat and controls her own des-

159. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 528–30.
160. Id. at 531.
161. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 106, at 624–25 (describing the “swearing contest” that takes place in court when interrogations are not recorded).
162. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 515–40.
163. If a suspect requests the presence of an attorney during the interrogation, then the strict rules of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981),
limiting the interrogator’s authority to reinitiate the questioning, would apply
in this context.
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tiny with respect to the interrogation and the conditions under
which she may agree to talk to the police.
CONCLUSION
Since Miranda was decided in 1966, courts and scholars
have devoted very little substantive attention to the content of
the warnings. In this time, however, much has changed. Empirical research and four decades of practical experience have
demonstrated that the warnings do not fully achieve their intended policy objectives. The legal rights embodied in the warnings have been altered, with new rights being recognized and
others falling into the background. In addition, the theoretical
underpinnings of the Miranda decision have evolved as much
as has the technological ability to regulate confession law
through modern devices such as video cameras. During this
time, the content of the warnings has remained static, failing to
keep pace with the dramatic changes in its environs.
In this Article, I have attempted to open the debate about
whether and how the Miranda warnings should be updated. I
have proposed some specific modifications and set forth a format for evaluating potential modifications. This format first
examines specific post-Miranda changes and developments in
law and practical knowledge, and then asks whether modifications to the warnings to reflect such new developments make
sense in light of the various justifications and theories of
Miranda put forth by scholars and courts.
With Miranda’s fortieth anniversary upon us, the time is
ripe to debate this issue in depth to determine whether and to
what extent the warnings need to be reformulated to once
again make them consistent with the legal theories that justify
their existence, and to make them more effective in enforcing
and protecting the constitutional rights they were designed to
serve.

